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The Limits of Law Enforcement*
Hans Zeisel**
I.

INTRODUCTION

Americans, as all public opinion polls show, complain bitterly
about the high level of crime in the United States, especially in the
inner cities.' One can see the justification for the complaint by
comparing crime statistics from America's largest city, New York,
with two cities that are roughly comparable in size, London and
Tokyo. In 1975 Tokyo, a city of 12 million people, had 174 homicides;2 London, a city of 12 million, had 143 homicides; s New York,
a city of 8 million, had 1,719 homicides. 4 Similarly, in 1975 Tokyo
had 416 robberies' and London had 4,420 robberies, 6 whereas New
York had 85,083 robberies. Although the crime rate in New York
is relatively high even by American standards, it is not significantly different from that of other major cities in the United
States.'
Understandably, the country wants something done about the
high crime rate, and, indeed, the politicians appear eager to respond-at least with words. Every presidential candidate will
promise more and better law enforcement, and, after he becomes
* This Article is derived primarily from a forthcoming book of the same title, which the
University of Chicago Press will publish in the fall of 1982. Many of the conclusions given

here are based on studies that are described and documented more fully in the book.
** Professor of Law and Sociology Emeritus, and Associate of the Center for Criminal
Justice Studies, University of Chicago.
1. See, e.g., DEMOCRATIC NAT'L COMMITTEE, A SURVEY OF THE POLITICAL CLIMATE IN
AMERICA AND VOTER ATTITUDES TOWARD THE 1982 ELECTION 5 (1982); LAW ENFORCEMENT
ASSISTANCE ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT CRIME: THE ATTITUDES OF
VICTIMS AND NONVICTIMS IN SELECTED CITIES (1977).
2.
BUREAU OF STATISTICS, OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER, JAPAN STATISTICAL YEARBOOK

630 (1977).
3. GREATER LONDON COUNCIL, [10] 1975 ANNUAL ABSTRACT OF GREATER LONDON STATISTICS, at 254 (1977).
4. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS:
CRIME IN THE U.S. 77 (1976).
5. JAPAN STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note 2, at 630.

6. GREATER LONDON STATISTICS, supra note 3, at 254.
7. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, supra note 4, at 77.
8. See, The Plague of Violent Crime, NEWSWEEK, March 23, 1981, at 52 (comparing
the FBI figures for murder, rape, and robbery in eight major U.S. cities in the years 1972,
1975, and 1980) [hereinafter cited as The Plague of Violent Crime].
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president, he will appoint a commission on crime that will make
several proposals to improve enforcement of the criminal law.9
Nevertheless, despite the laudable efforts of the most recent presidential commission and its many predecessors, the crime rate remains unaffected. Indeed, the thesis of this Article is that it is naive to believe improvements in law enforcement can have any
significant impact on the appallingly high crime rate. The data
presented below supports this proposition and thus buttresses the
conclusion that Judge Bazelon and many others have been making
for quite some time: street crime cannot be solved solely through
the institutional mechanisms of the police, the courts, or the prisons; society must adopt a dual approach to crime that not only
improves these institutional mechanisms, but also focuses on the
underlying causes of crime. 10
II.

A.

OPERATIONAL LIMITS

Conviction after Arrest

Any statistical account of the present crime rate must begin
with the number of committed felonies. We find this number from
the victimization surveys, in which a random sample of inhabitants
and institutions are asked for their experiences as victims of crime.
These surveys bring out the "dark" crime figures-those that
never appear in crime statistics because they represent the crimes
that, for one reason or another, are never reported to the police.11
The reasons for this failure to report are manifold, but the primary
cause stems from the victim's low expectation of satisfaction from
the law, buttressed by the fear that he will encounter all kinds of
bureaucratic unpleasantness.
The felonies reported to the police contribute the first step in
the law enforcement process. The expected next step is an arrest.
In a study that the author made in New York City in 1973, the
highest arrest rate was for the crime of homicide-approximately
sixty percent.1 This figure was much higher than the average fel9. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME: FINAL
(1981) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT].
10. See, e.g., Bazelon, The Crime Controversy: Avoiding Realities, 35 VAND. L. REV.
487 (1982); Bazelon, The Morality of the CriminalLaw, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 385 (1976).
11. See LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1978) (only 30% of crimes are reported). This type of
survey has proved to be one of the pioneering achievements of American criminology and
has served as an example for many other countries.
12. These and the following data are derived from the author's study of the law enREPORT
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ony arrest rate-though not surprisingly so. Since most murderers
know their victims, they are easier to apprehend than criminals
who commit other felonies. The highest rate for homicide in New
York did not affect significantly the aggregate arrest rate because
homicides account for less than one percent of all felonies. The arrest rate for robbery was considerably lower-below twenty percent-and the rate for burglary was lower still-approximately
three percent. Overall, the average arrest rate for all felonies examined in this study was twelve percent.
The next question is: what is the ultimate disposition of these
few successful felony arrests? Figure 1, which is set out below,
shows what happened to those people who were arrested in New
York City in 1973.
FIGURE 1
DISPOSITION OF FELONY ARRESTS IN THE
NEW YORK CRIMINAL COURT SYSTEM
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A surprisingly large proportion of the arrests, forty-four percent, resulted in dismissal. Fifty-four percent of the arrested offorcement process in New York City. This study was funded by a research grant from the
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of the United States Department of Justice
and was conducted by the author and several research associates. The study analyzed nearly
2,000 New York City Police Department felony arrest records for 1973 [hereinafter cited as
ZEISEL STUDY].
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fenders pleaded guilty; only two percent pleaded not guilty and
were brought to trial. Roughly one-half of these trials-about one
percent-ended in acquittal. s Thus, fifty-five percent of all arrested felony offenders eventually were convicted.
The second bar in Figure 1 denotes the sentences that the
court imposed on these convicted offenders. Roughly one-half of
them were given a "walk" sentence 1 4-typically probation, while
the other half were sentenced to jail or prison. The division between jail and prison sentences, which is set out in the third bar of
Figure 1, indicates that about four out of every five custody
sentences are jail terms of up to one year, while only one out of five
convicted offenders who receive a custody sentence goes to prison.
In sum, out of every 100 offenders whom the police arrest for a
felony, only about five go to prison for more than one year. 15
The most remarkable loss in these disposition statistics is the
proportion of cases that are dismissed-forty-four out of every 100
arrests. At first glance one might suspect that a loss of this magnitude is found only in New York City. Corresponding dismissal
rates in other American jurisdictions, however, show that the loss
is of approximately the same magnitude in the rest of the country.
In the State of California, for example, the loss rate was fifty-five
percent,1 6 and in Washington, D.C. it was fifty percent. 17 Apparently, then, a high dismissal rate is not a phenomenon that is limited to New York City, but one that affects the whole United
States.
At this point one might consider the high dismissal rate a peculiarly American institution to be blamed on the constitutional
restraints that are placed on the law enforcement officials who attempt to obtain criminal convictions. Comparable figures from Europe, however, contradict such an interpretation. Indeed, the startling similarity among all these loss rates leads to the inevitable
13. This statistic happened to be the figure for New York City during the year these
statistics were collected; normally, the proportion of acquittals in criminal jury trials is
roughly one-third of all cases. See H. KALVEN, JR. & H. ZEIsEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 58
(1966).
14. A walk sentence typically is defined as any punishment other than a custody sentence-for example, probation, community service, or a fine.
15. See also Van Dine, The Incapacitationof the Dangerous Offender: A Statistical
Experiment, 14 J. RESEARCH CRIME & DELINQUENCY 22, 31 (1977).
16. Div. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CAL. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ADULT FELONY ARREST DIsPosITIONS (1979).
17. Telephone interview with Brian Forst, Institute of Law and Social Research (IN-

SLAW) (Apr. 9, 1982).
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conclusion that under western standards of justice, the difference
between proof of probable cause, which suffices for an arrest, and
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, which is required for a conviction, will yield a dismissal rate of somewhere between thirty-five
and sixty percent of the prosecutions. This conclusion does not
mean that the loss rate cannot be reduced through more careful
police work. The comparable figures from Austria and Germany,
however, where fewer constitutional restraints are imposed on policemen and prosecutors, suggests that only minor advancement
may be expected from an improvement in evidence gathering.
B. Increasing the Arrest Rate?
Since, it seems, we cannot convict a much larger proportion of
the arrested offenders, one might consider the possibility of arresting more offenders-that is, of increasing the arrest rate from its
average of twelve percent.18 Unfortunately, this suggestion also
possesses little more than superficial appeal. To understand why
this would be so difficult, one must examine how felony arrests
typically are made. In New York City, approximately eighteen percent of all felony arrests were primarily the result of the policeman's accidental presence at or near the scene of the crime."' The
bulk of arrests occur when a citizen notifies the police that a crime
is being or has been committed, and the police hurry to arrive at
the scene in time. If they appear when the offender is still at or
near the scene, then they can arrest him. If he is gone, however,
the police typically can make the arrest only if an eyewitness can
identify the offender. If an unknown offender escapes from the
scene of the crime, only a small chance exists that he will be apprehended. Detective work plays a relatively small role in the apprehension of criminals.20 Compared to its chances of success, detective work, as a rule, is too costly and thus a waste of resources.
The police could increase two types of arrests at will: arrests
for assaults in a domestic setting and arrests of drug vendors. The
former are not pursued in most cases because fighting family members or lovers are likely to forget their quarrels and thereby make
criminal prosecutions difficult. Increasing the number of arrests of
drug offenders, on the other hand, would require a considerable
18. See supra FIGURE 1 and accompanying text.
19. ZEISEL STUDY, supra note 12.
20. These observations are based on interviews with arresting police officers in New
York City.
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increase in invested police resources for only a temporary and
nominal benefit. Since over ninety percent of the illegal drugs that
are consumed in the United States come from abroad,", the most
effective avenue through which to reduce drug-related offenses is
on the federal-and not on the local-level.
In many cities the police have tried to increase their arrest
rates either by attempting to expedite their arrival at the scene of
the crime, or by shifting police power from patrol cars to foot patrolmen.2 2 None of these efforts, however, has resulted in a substantial rise in the arrest rate. 23 Thus, the conclusion is inescapable
that short of an expansion in the police by a magnitude that is
politically and financially unrealistic, the number of arrests-the
foundation of the law enforcement process-cannot be increased
significantly.
C. Increasing Sentences
If we can neither arrest nor convict more offenders, we can
increase the sentences the courts impose on the convicted offenders. Many states have taken precisely this step24 in the forlorn
hope that more severe sentences will reduce the alarmingly high
crime rate. Some of these states have legislated higher sentences;
in some states the existing laws give the judge sufficient discretion
to increase a sentence if he believes that such a step is necessary.
As a result of this national concensus, more convicted offenders are
now being sent to jail or prison-often also for longer periods of
25
time.
Of course, these changes have some effect on the crime rate by
taking more offenders off the street for a longer time and keeping
them-at least for that period-from plying their nefarious trade.
The effect of this incapacitation, however, is smaller than one
might think. The best estimate is that a doubling of the duration
of all the custody sentences that we currently are imposing would
21. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 28.
22. See POLICE FOUNDATION, POLICE PRACTICES 9-12 (1978 study of the Kansas City,
Mo., police department).

23. Id. See

POLICE FOUNDATION,

PROGRESS

IN

POLICING:

ESSAYS

ON

CHANGE

(Staufenberger ed. 1980).
24. See A. LIPSON & M. PETERSON, CALIFORNIA JUSTICE UNDER DETERMINANT SENTENCING:

A
25.

REVIEW AND AGENDA FOR RESEARCH

Id. See

(1980).

MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SECT., BD. OF PRISON TERMS, STATE OF CALIFOR-

PRACTICES UNDER THE DETERMINATE SENTENCING LAW (1982); Casper,
Brerton & Neil, Implementation of the California Determinant Sentencing Law (Nat'l
Crim. Just. Reference Serv., 1982).
NIA SENTENCING
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result in only a thirteen percent reduction in the number of robberies and a three percent reduction in the number of burglaries.2"
The hope, however, of those who recommend higher sentences
goes in another direction. They expect that such doubling of the
sentences will have a larger if indirect effect on the crime rate by
increasing the deterrent threat of the criminal law. Once again the
evidence does not support the expectation of these theorists. The
deterrent effect of increased sentences, of course, is difficult to
measure. Nevertheless, two particularly applicable examples have
been measured with great care: the dramatic increase in the prison
sentences for drug related offenders in New York State under former governor Nelson Rockefeller, and the increase in the sentence
for murder from life imprisonment to death.
The 1973 New York drug law27 was a political reaction to the
growing national concern about drug abuse in the late 1960's. For
many years, New York had been directing low-level users of illegal
drugs into drug treatment programs on the theory that this remedy would be more effective in limiting drug traffic than invoking
criminal penalties. By the early 1970's, however, people generally
agreed that this approach was not working.2 8 The new drug law,
therefore, had two main objectives: to deter drug users and dealers
from engaging in their trade and to reduce the number of crimes
such as robbery, burglary, and theft that commonly are associated
with drug addiction.29 The New York law imposed stringent
mandatory minimum sentences on those offenders whom the police
caught selling or in possession of illegal drugs, 0 and, as a result, it
became known as the "toughest drug law in the country."3 1
Shortly after the 1973 legislation went into effect, The Association of the Bar of the City of New York and the Drug Abuse
Counsel jointly organized a committee to evaluate the effectiveness
26.

ZEISEL STUDY, supra note 12.
27. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 220.00-.60 (McKinney Supp. 1974-75). See also id. at § 10.00
(McKinney 1975) (related sentencing provisions). For significant subsequent amendments,
see 1975 N.Y. LAWS chs. 785 & 832, and 1976 N.Y. LAWS ch. 424.
28. LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE NATION'S
TOUGHEST DRUG LAW: EVALUATING THE NEW YORK EXPERIENCE 3 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
THE NATION'S TOUGHEST DRUG LAW].

29. Id.
30. For example, the possession of one ounce or the sale of one-eighth ounce of marijuana was a Class A felony. Conviction of a Class A felony resulted in a mandatory minimum sentence of six years in prison. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.18(1) (McKinney Supp. 1974-

75).
31.

343, 352.

Colangelo, Recent Trends in State Drug Legislation, 1976 AM. SURV. OF AM. L.
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of the law. Since New York was the only state to take such a
strongly deterrent stance on drug-related offenses, it provided a
good opportunity to study this approach. When the New York legislature significantly amended the 1973 law in 1976, the committee
decided to complete its work and announce its findings. The complex report of the committee is summarized in the simple statement that during the period in which the law was in effect,
"[n] either heroin use nor drug-related crime declined in New York

State.""s
The deterrent effect of the death penalty has been a topic of
considerable debate for many years.3 With one subsequently discredited exception, 4 all efforts to discover a deterrent effect of the
death penalty over the alternative-the sentence of life in
prison-have failed. The following two graphs illustrate this failure. Figure 2, which is set out below, compares the number of
criminal homicides per 100,000 people between 1960 and 1969 in
states that actually imposed the death penalty with states that either did not levy that sanction or had not executed anyone since

1948.

32. THE NATION'S TOUGHEST DRUG LAW, supra note 28, at 7.
33. See, e.g., F. CARRINGTON, NEITHER CRUEL NOR UNUSUAL (1978); R. CLARK, CRIME IN
AMERICA 330-46 (1970); Forst, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment:A Cross-State
Analysis of the 1960's, 61 MINN. L. REV. 743 (1977); Passell, The Deterrent Effect of the
Death Penalty: A Statistical Test, 28 STAN. L. REv. 61 (1975).
34. The exception was a study by Isaac Ehrlich in 1975. Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect
of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 397 (1975). Ehrlich's study received nationwide attention when the solicitor general of the United States, in
the course of litigating the death penalty before the United States Supreme Court, put the
findings of the study into his brief to show there was respectable opinion that the death
penalty was a successful deterrent.
Because of its startling claim that every execution saved eight lives by deterring their
murder, Ehrlich's study came under the close scrutiny of a number of scholarly investigations. See, e.g., Brier & Fienberg, Recent EconometricModelling of Crime and Punishment:
Support for the Deterrence Hypothesis? in U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUDICATORS OF CRIME AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: QUANTITATIVE STUDIES (1980) ("Ehrlich's affirmative conclusions regarding the deterrent effect of punishment on crime in general, and of capital punishment on
murder in particular, do not stand up to careful scrutiny."); Klein, Forst & Flator, The
Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: An Assessment of the Estimates, in NAT'L AcAD.
OF Sc., DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION (1976) ("In short, we see too many plausible explanations for his finding ...
other than the theory that capital punishment deters murder
....
Ehrlich's results cannot be used at this time.., to pass judgment on the use of the
death penalty."); Bowers & Pierce, The Illusion of Deterrence in Issac Ehrlich's Research
on CapitalPunishment, 85 YALE L.J. 187 (1975) ("[W]e conclude that [Ehrlich] has failed
to provide any reliable evidence that the death penalty deters murder. His data are inadequate for the purposes of his analysis and he misapplies the highly sophisticated statistical
techniques he employs."); Passell, supra note 33, at 80 ("We know of no reasonable way of
interpreting the [Ehrlich] cross-section data that would lend support to the deterrence
Hypothesis.").
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FIGURE 2
HOMICME RATES, 1960-1969:
STATES WITH AND WITHOUT ExECUTIONS

1960-1969
States with Executions

1960

States without Executions

1969

1960

1969

As is evident from the graphs, the homicide rate fluctuated in both
groups of states in almost exactly the same pattern. Moreover, the
findings for the second decade of the study, which are set out below in Figure 3 showed remarkably little change in the consistency
of the results.
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HOMICIDE RATEs, 1971-1979:
STATES WITH AND WITHOUT THE DEATH PENALTY
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These observations lead to two fundamental conclusions. First,
the homicide rate is determined by powerful causes that are deeply
embedded in society and about which we have only dim
knowledge. Second, the deterrent effect of the death penalty is
clearly not one of these causes; otherwise, the curves for states that
impose and carry out the death penalty would be different from
the curves for states in which no threat of the death penalty exists.
Thus, in the two instances in which a drastic increase in the
severity of punishment has been carefully observed, no deterrent
effect has been found. There remains, of course, the incapacitation
effect. Against this, one must consider that such an advantage
would require a sizeable investment on the part of society which is
even beyond what it now spends. At present, for example, each
person who is incarcerated in a prison costs the taxpayer between
$10,000 and $30,000 per year.3 Moreover, because the prisons
themselves are dangerously overcrowded, construction of new
cells is presently underway in forty-one states at an estimated cost
35. The Plague of Violent Crime, supra note 8, at 54.
36. TASK FoRCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 76.
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of $70,000 per cell. 7 In addition, although the cost to society of
ineffective rehabilitation efforts and intolerable prison conditions
is hard to measure, it certainly is significant. 8 Thus, before society
embarks on a course that would entail an ever increasing financial
and political commitment, it should focus on who the offenders are
and why they are offending.
III.

THE

DUAL

APPROACH TO CRIME

This brief examination of the law enforcement process has revealed the narrow operational limits of that process. Indeed, the
fundamental flaw in any approach that focuses on increasing law
enforcement is that the entire law enforcement process comes too
late in two ways. First, the process becomes operational by definition only after it has failed and a crime has been committed. Second, law enforcement is applied too late in the lives of the offenders. Almost thirty-six percent of all felonies are committed by
young men before they reach the age of twenty. 9 Since society-for good reasons-hesitates to exercise the full power of the
criminal law on young offenders, that power intervenes at a point
in the life of the offender when his criminal propensities have
hardened.
If more and better law enforcement is unlikely to reduce
crime, to where are we to look for help? To find the answer, we
must reexamine the narrow, self-limiting scope of the criminal law.
The fictional judge in Samuel Butler's novel Erewhon perhaps best
alluded to this notion when he summarized the law's position
before pronouncing sentence on a convicted defendant:
You may say that it is not your fault. The answer is ready enough at hand,
and it amounts to this-that if you had been born of healthy and well-to-do
parents, and been well taken care of when you were a child, you would never
have offended against the laws of your country, nor found yourself in your
present disgraceful position. If you tell me that you had no hand in your
parentage and education, and that it is therefore unjust to lay these things to
your charge, I answer that whether your being in a consumption is your fault
or no, it is a fault in you, and it is my duty to see that against such faults as
this the commonwealth shall be protected. You may say that it is your misfortune to be criminal; I answer that it is your crime to be unfortunate.... I
37. D. GORDON, DOING VIOLENCE TO THE CRIME PROBLEM: A RESPONSE TO THE ATroRNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE 7 (1981).
38. More than two dozen states are presently under court order to relieve overcrowding and improve living conditions in their penitentiaries. The Plague of Violent Crime,
supra note 8, at 54.
39. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS:
CRIME IN THE U.S. 200 (1980) (35.9%).
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do not hesitate therefore to sentence you
to imprisonment, with hard labor,
40
for the rest of your miserable existence.

While the law remains disinterested, we have become increasingly aware that crime-like everything else-has causes. The notion that crime might have identifiable causes is a relatively recent
insight-barely older than 140 years. The first important commentator to explore the causes of crime was the French statistician
Adolphe Quetelet. 41 Ever since, criminologists have been searching
for the causes of crime. These causes are complex and difficult to
determine. What we know now has been succinctly summarized by
Judge Bazelon: "It is not news that almost all perpetrators of
street crime come from the bottom of the socio-economic ladder-from among the ignorant, the ill-educated, the unemployed
and the unemployable.

' 42

In our time these persons are more nu-

merous among blacks and hispanics; a century or more ago, they
were the Irish. According to the author's study of arrest rates in
New York City, the number of felony arrests for young black men
in the sixteen to nineteen year age bracket was sixteen percent annually, while it was only two percent for white males of the same
age. 43 Thus, the relevant factor in the crime rate is not the offender's color, but being at the bottom of society.
Thus, we know with unusual precision where crime grows and
whom it affects. All we have to do now is confront that knowledge
and make proper use of it. Even though the approach clearly fails
to produce tangible results, we hear little else but the proposals to
solve the crime problem through more and better law enforcement.
The only effective solution to the problem, however, is to supplement law enforcement which punishes crime with efforts that try
to prevent it.
This dual approach-enforcement and prevention-has been
implemented with considerable success in other areas. For example, death on the highway-deaths and severe injuries resulting
from automobile collisions-has been a vexing problem for the last
thirty years.44 Many of these accidents are caused by lawlessness
and careless or drunk drivers, and a natural reaction would have
40. S. BUTLER, EREWHON 113 (1977).
41. A. QUETELET, A TREATISE ON MAN AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF His FACULTIES 82-96
(1842).
42. Letter from Judge David L. Bazelon to the New York Times (Oct. 19, 1980).
43. ZEISEL STUDY, supra note 12.
44. See, e.g., 1 F. HOBBS & B. RICHARDSON, TRAFFIC ENGINEERING 171-209 (1967); Mosher, The Highway Environment and Safety, in TRAFFIC SAFETY: A NATIONAL PROBLEM 69
(1967).
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been to seek a solution by concentrating on more and better law
enforcement on the highways. If this reaction had been the only
response to the problems, the death toll from automobile collisions
would be much higher than it is today. Instead, the major effort to
curb the highway death toll has been through prevention.45 The
practice of medicine provides another analogy. Our medical doctors would be far less effective if their help only came after the
damage is done; preventive medicine is an important branch of
their efforts to keep us in good health.
If society is serious about reducing crime, it must cease its exclusive reliance on law enforcement and pay more attention to
crime prevention. Some steps in that direction have been made,
although they have been mostly on the mechanical level: better
locks on cars and apartments; ineradicable automobile numbers;
better street lighting; and the like. Moreover, if society were prepared to eliminate some of the fifty million handguns in the
United States," it could prevent even more crime.
We have utterly neglected the human dimension of the causes
of crime, even though criminologists know with great precision who
these perpetrators of crime are and where they are concentrated.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Society will not be able to solve the crime problem before it
has solved the problems of the ghettos. Such an undertaking is a
big task, on which society thus far has worked with little diligence.
Even if efforts are increased beyond their present level, the task
will take a long time. Nevertheless, the question must be addressed, and the statistics point precisely to where the endeavor
must begin. Crime typically starts early in life, therefore, radical
efforts should be made to reach these crime-prone youths before
their life style is fixed. One particular statistic illuminates the
problem and suggests a point of access. In the New York City
school system the average daily truancy rate in the alternative high
schools was thirty-six percent for the school year 1980-1981.'
Thus, the first and most essential step in a dual approach to crime
45. Id. Studies have shown that the way a highway is built is linked inexorably to the
number of deaths and injuries it will produce. Solid separation of the two traffic directions
is the most effective life saver. Adding at least one passing lane, eliminating crossings
through underpasses, reducing the steepness of curves, and providing long entrance lanes all
reduce collisions. Id.
46.

J. WRIGHT & P. Rossi, WEAPONS AND VIOLENT CRIME (1981).

47.

NEw YORK BD. OF EDUC., 1980-81 ANNUAL REPORT.
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is to reach these youths before they become habitual truants. Of
course, this effort must begin at a much earlier age than it does
today, and the teachers in the public school systems must act as
admired role models for their pupils.
The ultimate question, however, is not whether these reforms
in the ghettos can be effectuated; rather, the real issue is whether
society is willing to make the necessary commitments to improve
not only the criminal justice system itself, but also the societal
conditions from which most criminal activity grows. Once society is
serious about solving the crime problem, the obstacles to true reform will be reduced to only the ordinary difficulties inherent in
any worthwhile endeavor.

